McDonnell-Douglas safety

the crew rejected the take-off at a late stage, as a result of which the aircraft overran the runway ending. The aircraft and part of the airport infrastructure sustained serious damage

This serious incident resulted from the decision to put the airplane into descent when, as a result of a display error, it was neither on the localizer track nor on the glide path, and with no context defined for this improvised manoeuvre. The importance that AOM attached to accelerated training given to new co-pilots and to undertaking commercial flights contributed directly to the incident. Other contributory factors were: - the pilot’s fatigue; - the imbalance in the flight crew, made up of a very experienced instructor and an under-trained co-pilot, which led to the abrupt disappearance of teamwork and procedures the moment the workload increased; - airplane warning system ergonomics and a fault in the automatic pilot system.

The aircraft was on its initial climb, the crew heard an explosion and noticed that the right engine FIRE warning light was illuminated. They applied the Engine Failure emergency procedure, discharged the two extinguishers and performed an emergency landing.

The US NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly?s acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly.

At night under IMC conditions, the crew performed a non-stabilized approach, deliberately exited the protection envelope in the published procedure then performed a go-around while they were over-flying a built-up area at a height of around four hundred feet.

The MD 83 was cleared to take off. The Shorts 330 registered G-SSWN was then cleared to line up and to wait as « number two ». The controller believed that the two aircraft were at the threshold of the runway, whereas the Shorts had been cleared to use an intermediate taxiway. The Shorts entered the runway at the moment the MD 83 was reaching its rotation speed. The tip of the MD 83’s left wing went through the Shorts 330’s cockpit and hit both pilots.

The US NTSB determined that the probable causes of the accident were a fire of undetermined origin, an underestimate of fire severity, and misleading fire progress information provided to the captain. The time taken to evaluate the nature of the fire and to decide to initiate an emergency descent contributed to the severity of the accident.

On landing, the aircraft bounced a number of times and the ground spoilers did not deploy. While the pilot applied maximum thrust reverse and maximum manual braking, complete deceleration was not achieved in sufficient time to stop the aircraft departing the end of RWY 24 and rolling some 230 ft into the grass over-run area.

On July 31, 1997, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11,operated by Federal Express, Inc., crashed while landing on runway 22R at Newark International Airport, USA. The regularly scheduled cargo flight originated in Singapore on July 30 with intermediate stops in Penang, Malaysia; Taipei, Taiwan; and Anchorage, Alaska. On board were the captain and first officer, who had taken over the flight in Anchorage for the final leg to EWR, one jumpseat passenger, and two cabin passengers. All five occupants received minor injuries in the crash and during subsequent egress through a cockpit window. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a postcrash fire. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's overcontrol of the airplane during the landing and his failure to execute a go-around from a destabilized flare. Contributing to the accident was the captain's concern with touching down early to ensure adequate stopping distance.

On 21 October 2004 the DC-9-83 was scheduled on a charter flight from Zurich (Switzerland) to Pristina (Kosovo). The first approach was performed on runway 35 at Pristina. A go around was performed under demanding weather conditions because the aircraft could not be stabilized in short final. On this occasion the left wing made contact with the runway surface, whereby parts of the wing were damaged. There were no injuries to persons. After a second approach from the opposite direction the landing on runway 17 was uneventful.

This NTSB report explains the accident involving Federal Express flight 1406, a Douglas DC-10-10, which made an emergency landing at Stewart International Airport on September 5, 1996, after the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment.

On August 24 1999, an MD-90 had just landed and was rolling on Runway when a explosion was heard in the front section of the passenger cabin, followed by smoke and then fire...

Passengers were commanded to remove their shoes before evacuating the aircraft, which slowed the evacuation and could have caused injuries or loss of life in a fire or other critical situation, the official U.S. accident investigation report said.

Runway visual range was about 200 meters/700 feet when the crew of a Cessna Citation CJ2 taxied on the wrong taxiway and into the path of a Boeing MD-87 that was taking off on the active runway at Milan, Italy.

Insufficient lubrication led to excessive wear and to failure of the jackscrew assembly in the McDonnell Douglas MD-83’s horizontal-stabilizer-trim system. The failure caused the horizontal stabilizer to jam in a position beyond normal limits and the aircraft to enter a nose-down pitch attitude from which recovery was not possible.

The investigation generated recommendations about the practice of clearing more than one aircraft onto a runway, the terminology used in takeoff clearances, coordination among controllers and the use of different languages in controller-pilot communication.

The investigation of the approach-and-landing accident generated several recommendations, including improvement of standard operating procedures regarding the use of airplane spoiler systems, autobrake systems and reverse thrust on wet/slippery runways.

This report explains the accident involving a MD-82, which crashed after it overran the end of runway 4R during landing at Little Rock National Airport in Little Rock, Arkansas, USA. Safety issues discussed in this report focus on flight crew performance, flight crew decision-making regarding operations in adverse weather, pilot fatigue, weather information dissemination, emergency response, frangibility of airport structures.

The right wing separated from the fuselage during the second touchdown on the runway, and the airplane rolled and came to rest inverted. The five occupants received minor injuries during the impact and evacuation. The investigation generated a recommendation for pilot training on conducting stabilized approaches through the landing flare.

Inadequate material-flammability-certification standards and the absence of training and procedures for in-flight fire fighting were among the factors cited in the propagation of a fire that became uncontrollable and caused a loss of control of the airplane off the coast of Nova Scotia, Canada.

Inadequate crosswind-landing technique by the pilot flying and inadequate monitoring by the pilot not flying were cited in the collapse of the Boeing MD-10’s right main landing gear on touchdown

This report explains the accident involving an MD-88, which experienced an uncontained engine failure during the initial part of its takeoff roll at Pensacola Regional Airport in Pensacola, Florida (USA) on July 6, 1996. Safety issues in the report include the limitations of the blue etch anodize process, manufacturing defects, standards for the fluorescent penetrant inspection process, the performance of nondestructive testing, the use of alarm systems for emergency situations, and instructions regarding emergency exits.

Flight Crew’s Failure to Perform Landing Checklist Results in DC-9 Wheels-up Landing

The cockpit crew had no means to extinguish or suppress the fire because the cargo compartment was not equipped (nor was it required to be equipped) with a fire extinguisher, the official report said.

The captain ignored several cues that the unstabilized approach should have been aborted. These included excessive airspeed, an alert from the ground-proximity warning system, lack of green lights signaling that the landing gear was down and locked, and the sounding of the gear-warning horn.

The approach was continued into severe convective activity and the crew failed to recognize a wind-shear situation in a timely manner. The failure of the air traffic controller to report radar data and other pertinent weather information to the crew was a contributing factor to the accident, the official U.S. report said.

Contributing factors included the pilots’ unfamiliarity with an actual DC-8 stall, the test flight at night without a visual horizon and an engine-compressor stall that might have distracted the flight crew at a critical time.

Although the flight was legal under the regulations governing it, the accident flight crew would not have met the legal crew-rest requirements for a revenue flight, the official U.S. report said.

The cargo was not loaded aboard the airplane according to the airline’s instructions. As a result, the flight crew inadvertently used a horizontal-stabilizer-trim setting that was not correct for the airplane’s aft center of gravity.

Absence of the bolt caused the right elevator control tab to become disconnected. The control tab then jammed as the flight crew began a night takeoff. During the crew’s attempt to return to the airport, the aircraft struck the ground and was destroyed. All the crewmembers were killed.

Although there were only minor injuries in the evacuation, the evacuation was delayed by the flight crew’s failure to depressurize the aircraft. Investigators were unable to determine the fire’s ignition source but found evidence of undeclared hazardous cargo.

The flight crew encountered showers, turbulence and a strong, gusting crosswind on final approach. The airplane touched down about midpoint on the wet runway, overran the runway, struck localizer antennas and came to a stop with the forward section of the fuselage in a lagoon.

The accident raised crew-training issues and renewed concern about rejected takeoffs when runways are wet or contaminated by slush or snow, the official Canadian accident report said.

The approach controller did not warn the crew of the possibility of wind shear, but the official Portuguese accident report noted that such an experienced crew should have been aware that wind shear was a possibility.

Mc Donnell Douglas DC10 Emergency after Smoke detection After Smoke Detected in Cargo Compartment Crew Lands DC-10, Then Fire Destroys Aircraft