Bombardier safety

During the approach, the crew was unaware of 40-knot winds that led to the controlled-flight-into-terrain accident during instrument meteorological conditions. At the time of the accident, no emergency locator transmitter was required on the turbojet; the accident site was not located until nearly three years after the aircraft was reported missing.

A witness saw the airplane ‘skimming’ the clouds in the traffic pattern before entering a low-altitude turn with a bank angle of almost 90 degrees. The airplane then descended to the ground.

The pilot said that he rejected the landing when the aircraft veered left after touchdown. He said that although the thrust levers were positioned full forward, the aircraft did not accelerate after lifting off the runway.

The airplane remained airborne about three hours, 46 minutes after the last known radio transmission by the crew and struck terrain far from the intended destination. The investigation did not determine what had caused the airplane’s cabin to depressurize or why the pilots had not used, or had not received, supplemental oxygen after the cabin depressurized.

The report said that the judgment and concentration of the flight crew, who were aware of the wing contamination but did not have the aircraft deiced before departure, might have been impaired by the combined effects of a nonprescription drug, jet lag and fatigue.

The US National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident was incapacitation of the flight crewmembers as a result of their failure to receive supplemental oxygen following a loss of cabin pressurization, for undetermined reasons.

The US NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flight crew to maintain terrain clearance during a VFR departure, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain and the air traffic controller’s issuance of a clearance that transferred the responsibility for terrain clearance from the flight crew to the controller, failure to provide terrain clearance instructions to the flight crew, and failure to advise the flight crew of the MSAW alerts. Contributing to the accident was the pilots’ fatigue, which likely contributed to their degraded decision-making.

The US NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of airplane control for undetermined reasons.

Shortly after crossing the final approach fix, sighted what they believed to be the runway. The aircraft touched down in a grassy area 151 feet to the right of the runway and 1900 feet beyond the runway threshold.

During the take-off run, a three-foot piece of the wing leading edge (with the de-ice boot attached) separated from the left wing. The flight crew noticed a vibration on the flight controls during the initial climb after take-off

During the initial climb following take-off, the FO noted that abnormal forward pressure on the control column was required to keep the aircraft from pitching nose up. To counter the pitch-up, he trimmed the aircraft nose down. Thirty seconds after becoming airborne, the aircraft was 350 feet above ground level and the FO had applied full nose-down trim. The amount of forward pressure on the control column continued to increase as the aircraft accelerated, and the FO notified the captain of the control difficulties and requested his assistance in holding the control column forward.

Shortly after initiating a descent, an oily smell was noticed on the flight deck, followed by a smoke build-up in the flight deck and cabin. The flight crew carried out the initial part of the smoke checklist procedure, declared an emergency and carried out a diversion...

The US NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the pilots’ failure to ensure the airplane was loaded within weight-and-balance limits and their attempt to take off with the center of gravity well forward of the forward takeoff limit, which prevented the airplane from rotating at the intended rotation speed.

A Canadair CL-600-2A12 collided with the ground during takeoff. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and snow was falling. Of the six occupants on board, the captain, the flight attendant, and one passenger were killed, and the first officer and two passengers were seriously injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire.

The US NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s excessive takeoff rotation, during an aft center of gravity (c.g.) takeoff, a rearward migration of fuel during acceleration and takeoff and consequent shift in the airplane’s aft c.g. to aft of the aft c.g. limit, which caused the airplane to stall at an altitude too low for recovery.

This report explains the accident involving a Bombardier CRJ-200 which crashed into a residential area about 2.5 miles south of Jefferson City Memorial Airport, Jefferson City, Missouri. During the flight, both engines flamed out after a pilot-induced aerodynamic stall and were unable to be restarted.

On an ILS approach the aeroplane deviated progressively to the left of the normal runway approach track. It passed above and then below the glide path and descended until it touched the more than 1 NM before the runway threshold. The aeroplane struck several obstacles and caught fire.

The US NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crewmembers’ failure to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane’s location on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s nonpertinent conversation during taxi, which resulted in a loss of positional awareness, and the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control clearances.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada said that there was insufficient time for the CRJ engines to spool up to go-around thrust, and that a thin accumulation of ice was a major factor in causing the airplane to stall at a lower-than-normal stall angle-of-attack. The crew lost control of the airplane, and the airplane struck the runway and terrain.