Boeing safety

On 7 January 2013, an electrical burning smell and smoke was reported from the aft passenger cabin of a Boeing 787-8 which had just arrived at Boston from Tokyo Narita on a scheduled passenger flight. It was found that the source of the smoke was the Lithium-Ion APU battery located in the aft electrical equipment bay where both a flame and dense smoke were reported to have been seen coming from the battery case. The ARFF was called and the fire extinguished with a minor burn injury sustained by one fire fighter.

On 5 September 2001, a Boeing 777-200 on the ground at Denver, Colorado, was substantially damaged, and a refuelling operative killed, when a fire broke out following the failure of a refuelling coupling under pressure because of improper attachment.

On 26 September 2009, a Boeing 777-200 on a scheduled day passenger flight from St Kitts to Antigua unintentionally began and completed take off from a different intermediate position on the departure runway than the one intended in normal ground visibility and just succeeded in becoming airborne before the end of the paved surface was reached. There was no damage to the aircraft and no injury to the 101 occupants.

On 1 March 2005, a Boeing 777-200 being on a scheduled passenger flight from Lahore to Manchester experienced a landing gear fire during taxi in at destination after an apparently routine landing in normal day visibility. There were no flight deck indications of a significant fire but an emergency evacuation was recommended by attending Fire Crew and carried out. Thirty one of the 344 occupants sustained minor injuries during this evacuation and the rest were uninjured. Five firefighters also sustained minor injuries as they assisted passengers from the slides. Damage to the aircraft was minor.

The Boeing 777 crash landed just short of the runway at its destination.There were no fatalities but 47 people sustained injuries; one serious. Ice crystals in the fuel were blamed as the cause of the accident, clogging the fuel-oil heat exchanger (FOHE) of each engine. This restricted fuel flow to the engines when thrust was demanded during the final approach to Heathrow.Boeing identified the problem as specific to the Rolls-Royce engine fuel-oil heat exchangers, and Rolls-Royce subsequently developed a modification to its FOHE.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s descent during the visual approach, the PF’s unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew’s inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew’s delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances.

On 29 July 2011, a Boeing 777-200 was parked on the departure gate whilst awaiting the last few passengers and completion of hold loading when a fire suddenly began at the lower right hand side of the flight deck. Despite prompt attempts to extinguish the fire, it continued to burn out of control causing major structural damage to the front of the aircraft. However, all 317 occupants were safely evacuated using the still-attached air bridge access at doors 1L and 2L.

On 13 December 2008, a Boeing 767-300 departing from Manchester (UK) for Montego Bay (Jamaica) was considered to be accelerating at an abnormally slow rate during the take off roll on Runway 23L. The aircraft commander, who was the pilot not flying, consequently delayed the V1 call by about 10 - 15 kts because he thought the aircraft might be heavier than had been calculated. During the rotation the TAILSKID message illuminated momentarily, indicating that the aircraft had suffered a tail strike during the takeoff. The commander applied full power and shortly afterwards the stick shaker activated briefly. The aircraft continued to climb away and accelerate before the flaps were retracted and the after-takeoff check list completed. The appropriate drills in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) were subsequently actioned, fuel was dumped and the aircraft returned to Manchester for an overweight landing without further incident.

On 26 May 1991, a Boeing 767-300 being operated by Austrian carrier Lauda Air on a scheduled passenger service from Hong Kong to Vienna via Bangkok was climbing in night VMC when it went out of control and crashed fifteen minutes after departure from Bangkok about 100 nm northwest of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all 223 occupants were killed.

On 19 June 2009 a Boeing 767-300 on a scheduled passenger flight from Chicago O’Hare (USA) to Warsaw (Poland) was in the cruise at FL330 in night IMC when one of the air speed indicators suddenly displayed a false high reading, which triggered an over speed warning,and one of the altimeters recorded a simultaneous sudden increase. The flight crew response was based on the presumption that the speed increase was real and thrust was reduced and the aircraft put into a climb. A stall warning followed and descent was then made to a level 5000ft below the previous cruise level followed by a diversion to Toronto (Canada). There were no injuries to the 216 occupants and the aircraft was undamaged.

On 2 January 2005, a Boeing 767-300 on a scheduled passenger flight in day VMC from Toronto (Canada) to Santiago (Chile) was approximately 180 nm north of the intended destination and in the cruise at FL370 when it suffered a run down of the left engine which flight deck indications suggested was due to fuel starvation. A MAYDAY was declared to ATC and during the subsequent drift down descent, with the cross feed valve open, the failed engine was successfully restarted and the flight was completed with both engines operating without further incident.

The Boeing 767-300 aircraft was on a scheduled flight from Vancouver (Canada), to Toronto (Canada). While on final approach, approximately 10 miles from the airport, the flight crew received an aft cargo bay fire warning. The flight crew followed emergency checklist procedures, activated the cargo bay fire extinguishers, and declared an emergency. The fire warning light extinguished approximately 50 seconds after activation of the fire extinguishers. The aircraft landed on runway 06L and stopped to allow airport firefighters to inspect the aircraft for indications of fire.

The aircraft was taking off from Runway 23 for a short night flight to Liege, Belgium; the First Officer was the handling pilot. The takeoff was uneventful until, at about 5-10 kt below V1, the captain thought he might have seen some smoke in the cockpit. At this time the first officer was unable to confirm the presence of smoke. At approximately 500 ft, the captain turned-up his reading light and called that he could see smoke and the first officer confirmed that he could smell it.

On 29 December 2010 a Boeing 757-200 on a scheduled passenger flight from Chicago O’Hare (USA) to Jackson Hole (USA) failed to stop before the end of landing runway 19 at destination after a daylight landing in normal ground visibility with light snow falling and finally stopped in deep snow 220 metres beyond it. The aircraft incurred only minor damage and with none of the 185 occupants injured, the aircraft commander decided that the best option was for everyone to remain on the aircraft and await ground assistance. Passengers were eventually disembarked using steps and bussed to the Terminal.

On a scheduled passenger flight from Seattle/Tacoma (USA) to New York JFK (USA), the crew of a Boeing 757 lost significant electrical systems functionality en route. A diversion with an emergency declared was made to Chicago O’Hare (USA) where after making a visual daylight approach, the aircraft was intentionally steered off the landing runway when the aircraft commander perceived that an overrun would occur. None of the 192 occupants were injured and there was only minor damage to the aircraft landing gear.

The incident to the Boeing 757 aircraft occurred on the first flight following a 26-day major maintenance check. Shortly after takeoff on a scheduled passenger flight from London Heathrow (UK) to Paris (France), a hot oil smell, that had been present in the cockpit on engine startup, returned. The flight crew donned oxygen masks and immediately diverted to London Gatwick Airport. During the autopilot-coupled ILS approach to Gatwick, the aircraft drifted to the right of the localiser after selection of Flap 30. When the autopilot was disconnected, a large amount of manual left roll control was needed to prevent the aircraft from turning to the right. It was necessary to maintain this control input until touch down. The aircraft landed safely despite these difficulties, with no injuries to any of the passengers or crew. The investigation determined that the incident had been caused by maintenance errors that had culminated in the failure to reinstall two access panels, on the righthand outboard flap and incorrect procedures being used to service the engine oils. The events were the result of a combination of errors on the part of the individuals involved and systemic issues, that had greatly increased the probability of such errors being committed.

On May 16, 2010, the flight crew of a Boeing 757-200 declared an emergency because of a fire in the cockpit and diverted to Washington Dulles International Airport (USA)

On 2 October 1996, a Boeing 757-200 on a scheduled passenger flight at night from Lima (Peru) to Santiago (Chile) experienced control difficulties because of incorrect flight instrument readings. A return to Lima was attempted but when control was lost the aircraft impacted the sea and all 70 occupants were killed.

MK Airlines Limited Flight 1602 attempted to take off from Runway 24 at the Halifax International Airport. The aircraft overshot the end of the runway for a distance of 825 feet, became airborne for 325 feet, then struck an earthen berm. The aircraft’s tail section broke away from the fuselage, and the aircraft remained in the air for another 1200 feet before it struck terrain and burst into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a severe post-crash fire. All seven crew members suffered fatal injuries.

The aircraft encountered a brief period of severe turbulence during the cruise portion of flight, resulting in injuries to nine passengers and one cabin crew member. The flight crew had left the intended track to avoid significant weather which they had detected on weather radar. However, at the time of the incident, there was no significant weather indicated on radar.

On September 3, 2010, a Boeing 747-400 flying the route between Dubai International Airport and Cologne Bonn Airport developed an in-flight fire, with the fumes and subsequent crash resulting in the death of the two crewmembers. The aircraft had departed Dubai International earlier, but returned after reporting smoke in the cockpit. The crash caused an examination of safety procedures protecting airliners from cockpit smoke.

The pilot's decision to take-off in known adverse weather conditions and failure to execute the proper windshear recovery procedure resulted in operating the aircraft outside the safe flight regime, causing the aircraft to stall very close to the ground from which recovery was not possible.

After a stable instrument approach, the engines of the Boeing 737-800 remained at approach power during the landing flare and the aircraft bounced. The thrust levers were then moved to idle, the speed brakes deployed automatically and during the subsequent heavy landing, the tail of the aircraft scraped along the runway.

On 15 June 2006, a Boeing 737-300 cargo aircraft had to divert due to bad weather. On final approach the autopilot was disengaged for a short period. The aircraft touched down off the runway to the left, resulting in the right main landing gear being detached and the right wing tip and engine scraping the ground. The pilots managed to lift off again and subsequently made an emergency diversion where a landing was performed on the remaining two landing gears, during which the aircraft scraped on its nose and right engine. There were no injuries. The cause of the crash was determined to be a poorly timed message from local air traffic control which the pilot misinterpreted, causing him to descend too quickly.

On 20 August 2011, a Boeing 737-200 Cargo on a domestic passenger charter flight from Yellowknife, (Canada), to Resolute Bay (Canada). Whilst in the final stages of a daylight ILS approach at destination in IMC, the aircraft struck a hill about 1 mile to the east of the landing runway and was destroyed by the effects of the impact and subsequent post-crash fire. The military TWR controller at the destination airport did not see the aircraft at any time and there was a significant delay before the wreckage was located. Twelve of the 15 occupants were killed and the remaining 3 sustained serious injuries.

During an ILS approach, ATC instructed the crew to conduct a go-around. This maneuver was mishandled and it led to a slat and flap overspeed with an associated caution message. The QRH actions were not followed correctly. The crew continued to try to resolve the flap problem and, despite straying from the QRH instructions, they did ultimately regain normal flap control. When the aircraft arrived on stand, the total fuel was 700 kg below the final reserve figure and there was an imbalance of 500 kg between the tanks.

A Boeing 777-200 aircraft was landing in rain at the Singapore Changi airport, when its left hand landing gear momentarily departed the paved surface of Runway 02L and went onto the soft grass verge before returning to the paved runway surface. Subsequently, the aircraft taxied on its own to the designated passenger gate. All occupants disembarked unassisted using the aerobridge. There was no injury. All six tyres of the left hand landing gear showed evidence of reverted rubber aquaplaning and three of the tyres were deflated. The forward and aft junction boxes under the landing gear truck were damaged and separated from their attachments.

On 24 July 2011, a Boeing 777-300 on a scheduled passenger flight from Bangkok (Thailand) to Melbourne (Australia) descended so far below the vertical profile for the night non precision approach procedure being flown in VMC at destination that ATC, observing that the aircraft was below the minimum safe altitude for the range from touchdown, instructed the aircraft to fly a go around. However, despite acknowledgement, this instruction only resulted in the descent being arrested and the go around did not commence until a further instruction to do so was given nearly a minute later.

The aircraft contacted the runway and then bounced up into the air again before full runway contact was made with the main landing gear tires followed by the nose landing gear tire. The aircraft was not decelerated enough when nearing the runway end so the pilot flying attempted to turn the aircraft onto taxiway November at the end of the runway. The aircraft skidded off the taxiway and came to rest parallel to the taxiway with the nose landing gear and the right main landing gear off the paved surface.

The B767 climbed to its cruising altitude of 41,000 feet and the first hour of flight was straightforward for the experienced flight crew. The two pilots were shocked to see cockpit instruments warning of low fuel pressure in the left fuel pump. At first they thought it was a fuel pump failure. Seconds later, warning lights indicated loss of pressure in the right main fuel tank.

On takeoff both stick shakers began to operate continuously shortly before V1. The Captain elected to continue the takeoff and, after a period of troubleshooting in the air, dumped fuel and returned to land. Maintenance engineers consulted the aircraft BITE (Built-In Test Equipment) and replaced the right-hand ADC (Air Data Computer). The subsequent takeoff proceeded normally until approximately 5 kt before V1, when the stick shakers again began to operate. The Captain immediately rejected the takeoff and the aircraft was stopped safely approximately two-thirds of the way along the runway. There was no damage or injury. This report includes a number of Safety Actions implemented by the operator and the aircraft manufacturer.

This is a more detailed document of the australian registered Boeing 747 which overran the runway in Bangkok airport, Thailand (see above). The B747 was configured for a dry-runway landing when heavy rain occurred on final approach. The captain told the first officer (the pilot flying) to go around but then retarded the throttle levers when the main landing gear touched the runway. The airplane was substantially damaged. None of the occupants was injured seriously during the approach-and landing accident, but the delay in evacuation of the aircraft focused attention on improving training for emergencies.

The aircraft overshot the end of the runway for a distance of 825 feet, became airborne for 325 feet, then struck an earthen berm. The aircraft’s tail section broke away from the fuselage, and the aircraft remained in the air for another 1200 feet before it struck terrain and burst into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a severe post-crash fire. All seven crew members suffered fatal injuries.

The initial cause of the accident was the incomplete reduction of thrust on the left outer engine at the beginning of deceleration. This caused the de-activation of the automatic braking systems and the non-extension of the n° 1 thrust reverser. The inadvertent selection of full thrust on this engine after the landing created high thrust asymmetry leading to the runway excursion. The lack of co-ordination and of joint control by the crew members, perhaps aggravated by the presence of third parties in the cockpit, contributed to the development of this situation.

The causes of the accident were the incorrect positioning of a de-icing vehicle left without its driver and the crew’s incorrect perception of the dimensions of the obstacle in a difficult environment in terms of lighting.

On a scheduled cargo flight from Liège Airport (Belgium) to London Stansted Airport (UK) the crew diverted to Nottingham East Midlands Airport (UK) due to unexpectedly poor weather conditions at London Stansted. The weather conditions at East Midlands required a CAT IIIA approach and landing. On approach, at approximately 500 feet agl, the crew were passed a message by ATC advising them of a company request to divert to Liverpool Airport (UK). The Captain inadvertently disconnected both autopilots whilst attempting to reply to ATC. He then attempted to re-engage the autopilot in order to continue the approach. The aircraft diverged to the left of the runway centreline and developed a high rate of descent. The Captain commenced a go-around but was too late to prevent the aircraft contacting the grass some 90 m to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft became airborne again but, during contact with the ground, the right main landing gear had broken off. The crew subsequently made an emergency landing at Birmingham Airport (UK).

As the taxiway was covered with ice, the aircraft, when taking a turn, no longer reacted to the nose wheel steering. As a consequence, the aircraft skidded to the side of the apron and the left wing of the aircraft collided with a lamppost. The collision seriously damaged the aircraft and the lamppost.

The aircraft was at an altitude of 40,000 ft when the pilot in command noticed the cabin rate of climb indicator suddenly indicate a maximum rate of climb. The PIC disengaged the autopilot and commenced an emergency descent to an altitude of 10,000 ft.

A Boeing 737-400 aircraft was on a scheduled passenger flight from Surabaya, East Java to Manado, Sulawesi, at FL 350 when it disappeared from radar. The DFDR analysis showed that the aircraft was in cruise with the autopilot engaged. The autopilot was holding 5 degrees left aileron wheel in order to maintain wings level. Following the crew’s selection of the right IRS Mode Selector Unit to ATT (Attitude) mode, the autopilot disengaged. The control wheel then centered and the aircraft began a slow roll to the right. The aural alert, BANK ANGLE, sounded as the aircraft passed 35 degrees right bank. The DFDR data showed that roll rate was momentarily arrested several times, but there was only one significant attempt to arrest the roll. Positive and sustained roll attitude recovery was not achieved. Even after the aircraft had reached a bank angle of 100 degrees, with the pitch attitude approaching 60 degrees aircraft nose down, the pilot did not roll the aircraft’s wings level before attempting pitch recovery in accordance with standard operating procedures. The aircraft reached 3.5g, as the speed reached Mach 0.926 during sustained nose-up elevator control input while still in a right bank. The recorded airspeed exceeded Vdive (400 kcas), and reached a maximum of approximately 490 kcas just prior to the end of recording.

The crew of a B737-400 intended to make an ILS approach followed by a visual approach. Approximately 10 miles from the runway the airspeed was 283 knots. The PIC descended the aircraft steeply in an attempt to reach the runway, but in doing so, the airspeed increased excessively. Because the aircraft was being flown at speeds that were in excess of the wing flaps operation speed, the copilot elected not to extend the flaps as instructed by the PIC. During the approach, the GPWS alerts and warnings sounded 15 times and the copilot called for the PIC to go around. The PIC continued the approach with flaps 5, and the aircraft attained the glideslope near the runway 09 threshold. Flaps 5 degrees is not a landing flap setting. The aircraft crossed the threshold at an airspeed of 232 knots, 98 knots faster than the required landing speed for flaps 40 degrees. The wind was north easterly at 9 knots. The groundspeed was 235 knots. The aircraft touched down at an airspeed of 221 knots, 87 knots faster than landing speed for 40 degrees flap. Shortly after touching down, the copilot called, with high intonation, for the PIC to go around. The aircraft overran the departure end of the runway at 110 knots. The aircraft crossed a road, and impacted an embankment before stopping in a rice paddy field. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact forces and an intense, fuel-fed, post-impact fire. There were 119 survivors. One flight attendant and 20 passengers were fatally injured.

During takeoff from Tamanrasset (Algeria), a sharp thump was heard just after rotation. The left engine had just suffered a contained burst. The airplane swung to the left. The Captain took over the controls. The airplane lost speed progressively, stalled and crashed, with the landing gear still extended, about one thousand six hundred and forty-five meters from the takeoff point, to the left of the runway extended centerline.

A Boeing 727-200 freighter was scheduled a night cargo flight. On arrival the flight crew conducted two unsuccessful approaches in darkness and poor weather conditions before landing on the third approach. A post-flight inspection of the aircraft found visible damage on the left wing. The tip of the left outboard leading edge flap and the outboard trailing edge flap ?canoe? were abraded. The damage was consistent with a slight contact with the runway.

During takeoff the airplane, overloaded in an anarchic manner, was not able to climb at the usual rate and struck an airport building located a hundred and eighteen meters past the runway end on the extended runway centerline, crashed onto the beach and ended up in the ocean.

The aircraft suffered an in-flight failure of the DC Battery Bus, resulting in the loss of several aircraft systems including the standby ADI.

During a climb to FL270 with autopilot engaged, the aircraft did not capture the selected altitude. The Captain disconnected the autopilot and then experienced difficulty in accurately controlling the aircraft in pitch.

The flight crew responded to a visual illusion with an unwarranted power reduction, said the official accident investigation report. Just before landing, the aircraft's pitch attitude increased; the tail skid struck the runway surface as the aircraft landed.

Are you crossing the Atlantic today? It could be a good idea to read the following article.

On October 31, 1999, a Boeing 767-300ER crashed into the Atlantic Ocean about 60 miles south of Nantucket, Massachusetts( USA). The flight departed JFK about 0120, with 4 flight crewmembers, 10 flight attendants, and 203 passengers on board. All 217 people on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed.

The flight crew did not maintain visual contact with the runway while circling to land outside the circling-approach area at an airport in South Korea. The controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) accident occurred about five seconds after the first-officer called for a missed approach.

On their approach to Cali, Colombia, the flight crew selected a direct course to the ROMEO nondirectional beacon (NDB), believing that they were selecting the ROZO NDB. According to the Colombia Aeronautica Civil accident investigation report, the incorrect flight management system entry led the airplane to turn toward Bogota, Colombia, which was 212 kilometers (132 miles) to the northeast.

The crew of a Boeing 757-200, Flight 965, was transitioning from cruise flight to a very high frequency omni-directional radio range (VOR) / distance measuring equipment (DME) instrument approach to runway 19 at the Alfonso Bonilla Aragon International Airport (SKCL), Cali, Colombia, when the aircraft collided with a mountain 53 kilometers (33 miles) northeast of the CALI VOR.

Deviations from SOPs, deficient crew resource management and crew distraction were cited as factors in a controlled-flight-into-terrain accident that caused substantial airplane damage but no injuries.

Crew fails to compute crosswind component, Boeing 757 nosewheel collapses on landing

Investigators concluded that the airplane had a blocked pitot tube and that, during departure, the flight crew became confused by false indications of increasing airspeed and did not respond to a stall warning. All the occupants were killed when the airplane struck the Caribbean Sea off the northern coast of the Dominican Republic.

The Boeing 747 was configured for a dry-runway landing when heavy rain occurred on final approach to Bangkok, Thailand. The captain told the first officer (the pilot flying) to go around but then retarded the throttle levers when the main landing gear touched the runway. The airplane was substantially damaged. None of the occupants was injured seriously during the approach-and-landing accident, but the delay in evacuation of the aircraft focused attention on improving training for emergencies.

The airline's flight attendant procedures did not provide adequate guidance to flight attendants on how to coordinate their actions during and after the impact sequence, the official U.S. report said.

On May 25 2002, a Boeing 747-200 crashed into the Taiwan Strait approximately 23 NM NE of Makung, Penghu Islands of Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC). Radar data indicated that the aircraft experienced an in-flight breakup at an altitude of 34,900 feet, before reached its cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. The aircraft was on a scheduled passenger flight from Chiang Kai-Shek (CKS) International Airport, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC to Chek Lap Kok International Airport, Hong Kong, China. One hundred and seventy-five of the 225 occupants on board, which included 206 passengers and 19 crewmembers, sustained fatal injuries; the remainders are missing and presumed killed.

Investigators said that published procedures were not followed when the repair was performed more than 20 years before a structural failure occurred and the aircraft broke apart during flight.

Investigators concluded that a flammable mixture of fuel and air in the center-wing fuel tank likely was ignited by voltage from an external short circuit that was conducted into the tank by electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system.

During an instrument departure from London, England, the captain and the first officer received warnings about roll indications from the attitude-comparator system and from the flight engineer. The airplane was in a left turn, banked nearly 90 degrees, when it descended and struck the ground

On September 5, 2000, a Boeing B747-300 departed from Jakarta, Indonesia and experienced a serious incident shortly after take-off in which the No 1 engine’s fifth low pressure turbine (LPT) disk failed, ejecting debris damaging the airframe structure and several houses in a village.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the Korean Air flight 801 accident was the captain's failure to adequately brief and execute the nonprecision approach and the first officer's and flight engineer's failure to effectively monitor and cross-check the captain's execution of the approach. Contributing to these failures were the captain's fatigue and Korean Air's inadequate flight crew training.

Safety recommendations of the Aviation Safety Council of Taiwan, based on the Singapore Airlines Flight SQ006 accident, discuss the adequacy of some international standards for runway/taxiway signs, marking and lighting. The Boeing 747 struck concrete barriers, runway-construction pits and construction equipment during takeoff in heavy rain, strong winds and low visibility.

Fluid leaking from the cabin onto the yaw-damper coupler in the electronic-and-equipment bay affected electronic signals transmitted to the yaw-damper actuator and caused a dutch-roll oscillation.

All 132 occupants were killed when the airplane struck terrain near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S. The investigation report said that, following an encounter with wake turbulence, the airplane’s rudder moved to the limit of its travel, in a direction opposite to that commanded by the flight crew. The report said that the rudder-control anomaly most likely was caused by a malfunction of the rudder’s main power control unit.

Air traffic control instructions caused the Boeing 737 to be high, fast and close to the runway when the crew conducted a turn to establish the airplane on final approach to Burbank, California, U.S. Investigators concluded that the flight crew’s only safe option at the time was a go-around.

The airplane was high on approach to Patna, India, and the crew received clearance from air traffic control to conduct a 360-degree turn to reposition for landing. The airplane stalled and descended into a residential area. Fifty-five occupants of the airplane and five people on the ground were killed in the approach-and-landing accident.

This report is on the accident involving Boeing B737-300, which crashed into the Musi river near Palembang, South Sumatra, Indonesia, on 19 December 1997, The B737 was operating as a scheduled passenger flight from Jakarta Soekarno-Hatta International Airport to Singapore Changi Airport. The airplane descended from its cruising altitude of 35,000 feet and impacted the Musi river, near the village of Sunsang, about 30 nautical miles north-north-east of Palembang in South Sumatra. Prior to the sudden descent from 35,000 feet, the flight data recorders stopped recording at different times. There were no mayday calls transmitted from the airplane prior or during the descent. All 104 persons on board did not survive the accident, and the airplane was completely destroyed by impact forces.

Boeing 737 pilot flying selects incorrect altitude in holding pattern, causes dangerous loss of separation with MD-81

Report by Indonesian investigators cited lack of data and rejected U.S. National Transportation Safety Board suggested conclusions that the airplane’s descent was caused by intentional, sustained manual flight control inputs that most likely were made by the captain.

From London to Athens: how a fuel imbalance lead to control difficulty!

On January 14, 2002, a B737-200 tried to take-off from Syarif Kasim II, Pekanbaru, Riau (Indonesia). Feeling the AC was unable to leave the ground the flight crew aborted take-off, the AC went out of runway, hit the fences, and stopped at 240 m from the end of the runway 18.

On April 5, 1999, a Boeing B737-200 Adv, departed from Jakarta (Indonesia) for a multisector operation. On its third sector, the cockpit crew planned an approach on Runway 31. At 2500 ft altitude, the airfield was not in sight due to the cloud formation and local rain over the airport. The PF requested to land on Runway 13, and the aircraft was cleared to join right-hand down wind to Runway 13. After the localizer was established and while flying at 1500 ft altitude with the autopilot engaged, the runway was still not in sight by the crew. At 800 ft, the runway was in sight, and the PF then disengaged the autopilot at 500 ft. It was raining over the airport, and during flareout the PF felt that the aircraft did not touch the runway surface. The aircraft was reported veering to the right, and the PF failed to bring the aircraft to the R/W centerline. The aircraft came to a standstill at a position of about 15 m to the right of the centerline of Runway 13, and at a distance of 186 m from the end of the opposite runway.

The airplane was near gross weight during departure from an Algerian airport. The left engine failed but the crew did not retract the landing gear. Pitch attitude for a normal all-engine initial climb was maintained, and airspeed decreased to stall speed.

The flight crew was conducting a Category II ILS approach in instrument meteorological conditions. The airplane pitched down after crossing the middle marker, and the autopilot disconnected. The captain increased power and pulled back the control column to arrest the sink rate. The airplane struck terrain, bounced onto the runway and then veered off the runway.

No documents accurately showed the B727 weight and balance. The airplane takeoff weight likely was higher and its center of gravity likely was farther forward than the values calculated by the flight crew. High-density-altitude conditions prevailed during the attempted departure from a relatively short runway.

Fatigue and a color-vision deficiency that affected the ability of the pilot flying to observe glide-path-indicator lights contributed to the flight crew's failure to conduct a stabilized approach.

After takeoff from London Heathrow Airport a vapour trail was seen streaming aft of the aircraft. The flight crew diagnosed that the aircraft was probably leaking fuel from the centre wing fuel tank. They declared an emergency and decided to jettison fuel to reduce to maximum landing weight before returning to Heathrow.

The pilots misunderstood that the runway length had been reduced during a period of runway works and started their take-off with less engine thrust and flap than were required. During the take-off they saw work vehicles in the distance on the runway and, realising something was amiss, immediately applied full engine thrust and got airborne within the available runway length and cleared the work vehicles by about 28 metres.

At about the time when the engine integrated drive generators (IDGs) would normally come online, the flight crew saw the instrument displays flicker and heard a low-pitched, intermittent growling noise coming from the aft right side of the flight deck...

During an ETOPS flight abnormal warnings appeared on the flight deck and circuit breakers began tripping...

On 30 December 2006, a fire occurred in the left General Electric CF6-80C2 engine nacelle of a Boeing 767 aircraft as it taxied clear of the runway after landing at Auckland International Airport. The fire was promptly extinguished and the minor damage was confined within the nacelle.

On 1 July 2002 at 21:35:32 hrs a collision between a Tupolev TU154M, which was on a flight from Moscow, Russia to Barcelona, Spain, and a Boeing B757-200, on a flight from Bergamo, Italy to Brussels, Belgium, occurred north of the city of Ueberlingen, Germany. Both aircraft flew according to IFR and were under control of Zurich ACC, Switzerland. After the collision both aircraft crashed into an area north of Ueberlingen. There were a total of 71 people on board of the two airplanes, none of which survived the crash.

The left outboard engine of a B747 Classics ran down and could not be restarted. It was decided to return to Ramstein AFB (Germany). The crew determined that the three remaining engines were not producing the selected thrust and declared an emergency requesting a diversion to London Heathrow Airport (UK).

The crew of the Easyjet Boeing 737-700 that slipped on Schiphol Airport on the 22 December 2003, was insufficiently informed about the iciness of the taxiway. As the taxiway was covered with ice, the aircraft, when taking a turn, no longer reacted to the nose wheel steering. As a consequence, the aircraft skidded and the left wing of the aircraft collided with a lamppost. The collision seriously damaged the aircraft and the lamppost.

A Boeing 737-800 departed from Rotterdam Airport (Netherlands). The flight was scheduled for a three leg flight via Maastricht-Aachen Airport (Netherlands) and Arrecife (Spain), Lanzarote Airport (Spain) to Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (Netherlands). Immediately after initiation of the take -off, when the aircraft started to roll, the aircraft’s nose pitched up. This movement stopped when the aft fuselage and the tailskid assembly touched the ground. After the cockpit crew rejected the take -off, the aircraft’s nose touched the ground again and the aircraft was brought to a hold. The occurrence damaged the aircraft considerably. As a result, the crew could not resume the flight. None of the 113 passengers and seven crew members was injured. After the occurrence, the aircraft was taxied to the apron. At this location the passengers left the aircraft.

During the takeoff of a scheduled passenger transportation flight from Amsterdam (Netherlands) to Barcelona (Spain), the aircraft suffered a bird strike in the area of the nose landing gear during rotation. The flight crew informed the ATC and the flight continued without any abnormal indication in the cockpit. During the landing roll at Barcelona, when the nose wheels touched down, the aircraft started deviating to the left of runway 25R. The flight crew applied right rudder, brakes and used the nose wheel steering tiller but could not avoid that the aircraft went off the runway through the unprepared terrain located to the left of runway 25R. The aircraft suffered major damage during that run until it eventually came to a stop close to a wide rain drainage canal located at about 107 m from the runway axis.

The crew of a B737-800 did not realise that Runway 06L at Manchester (UK) was operating at reduced length due to work-in-progress at its far end until their aircraft had accelerated to a speed approaching VR...

Aircraft was too high during the visual approach. During a right hand orbit manoeuvre asked to the ATC, the aircraft flew low over the Bishopstown area of Cork City (Ireland) on its base leg. As the aircraft turned onto finals the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) Glide Slope CAUTION sounded twice...

Whilst in the cruise the crew began to feel some discomfort in their ears. This was shortly followed by cabin altitude warning horn which indicated that the cabin altitude had exceeded 10,000 feet and this was seen to continue to climb on the cockpit gauge. At the same time, the primary AUTO mode of the pressure control failed, shortly followed by the secondary STBY mode. The crew selected the first manual pressure control mode, but were unable to control the cabin altitude. An emergency descent and subsequent diversion was carried out.

On 14 August 2005, a B737-300 aircraft crashed near Grammatiko (Greece ) following the incapacitation of the crew due to hypoxia.

On March 5, 2000, Southwest Airlines,flight 1455, a Boeing 737-300 overran the departure end of runway 8 after landing at Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport, Burbank, California (USA). The airplane touched down at approximately 182 knots, and about 20 seconds later, at approximately 32 knots, collided with a metal blast fence and an airport perimeter wall.

A Boeing 757-200 on a passenger flight from Freetown (Sierra Leone) to London Heathrow (UK) was in the cruise at night in IMC at FL370 when vibration levels on both engines increased. When the prescribed ice shedding drill was followed, one engine malfunctioned and vibration on the other remained abnormally high and so a MAYDAY was declared and a diversion to Nouakchott (Mauritania) was made without further event. None of the 103 occupants were injured and there was no engine damage.

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During the ILS approach to runway 26L, without external visual references, in manual flight, the PF expressed his surprise about the airplane’s bank angle and flew a missed approach. At this time, the airplane was within 0.2 dots left of the localizer with a bank angle of 6°. The two pilots then simultaneously made inputs on the controls for 53 s. The pitch controls were desynchronized for 12 s due to opposing forces. Two brief episodes of roll control desynchronization were also observed. After recovering control of the flight path, the crew carried out a new approach to runway 27R without further incident.

Near CFIT in Africa during weather avoidance with the activation of EGPWS warning. Execution of an emergency maneuver, at night, enroute at FL90

The Boeing 777-300, impacted the runway during an attempted go-around at Dubai Airport (DXB), United Arab Emirates. All 300 on board survived the accident. One fire fighter was killed during the ARFF operations.The aircraft was destroyed.

Very serious incident that happened on December 19, 2021 and during which a Boeing B777-300ER failed to climb properly on takeoff from Dubai International Airport (DXB).

Immediately after take-off, the aircraft entered a shallow climb, and was at just 175 feet above the ground when passing a residential area beyond the end of the runway.

The final investigation report concluded that a fire erupted on or near the pallets containing dangerous goods and rapidly escalated into a large uncontained fire that caused some portions of the fuselage to separate from the aircraft in midair, thereby resulting in the crash.

The Boeing B737 MAX 8 crashed minutes after takeoff from Addis Ababa, Ethioia, killing all 157 people on board. Coming five months after another fatal crash involving a Boeing 737 MAX 8 passenger jet in Indonesia, Ethiopia’s disaster has sparked a crisis in the international aviation industry.

On 29 October 2018,a Boeing B737-8 MAX was being operated as a scheduled passenger flight from Jakarta  when the aircraft disappeared from radar after having informed ATC that they had flight control, altitude and airspeed issues. Shortly after, the aircraft impacted the water killing  all persons on board;