Flying technique

Industry statistics indicate that while only 3 percent of commercial-airplane-landing approaches meet the criteria for being unstabilized, 97 percent of these unstabilized approaches are continued to a landing, contrary to airline standard operating procedures. Most runway excursions can be attributed at least in part to unstabilized approaches, and runway excursions in several forms are the leading cause of accidents and incidents within the industry. Airlines should emphasize to flight crews the importance of making the proper go-around decision if their landing approach exhibits any element of an unstabilized approach.

The objective of this briefing is to provide information to help recognize the factors that increase the risk of a wake vortex encounter, Flying techniques to avoid wake turbulence and the information to help recognize the effects of wake turbulence.

Visual illusions result from many factors and appear in many different forms. Illusions occur when conditions modify the pilot’s perception of the environment relative to his or her expectations, possibly resulting in spatial disorientation or landing errors (e.g., landing short or landing long).

A runway excursion occurs when an aircraft departs the runway in use during the take-off or landing run. The excursion may be intentional or unintentional. there are 3 main types of Runway Excursion 1. A departing aircraft fails to become airborne or successfully reject the take off before reaching the end of the designated runway. 2. A landing aircraft is unable to stop before the end of the designated runway is reached. 3.An aircraft taking off, rejecting take off or landing departs the side of the designated runway.

Upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) will take many airline pilots out of their comfort zone, exposing them to places unknown. For most of their instructors, too, these places until recently were unfamiliar territory. This article explains why that is the case, and will help newcomers to this subject quickly grasp the essentials of the paradigm shift under way.

Tailwind Operations in fixed wing aircraft are considered to be takeoffs or landings with a performance diminishing wind component – that is, a tailwind.

This very interesting document makes the operational community aware of the review of the traditional methods of "Stall" and "Approach to Stall" recovery techniques

At the request of several international aviation organizations in late 2006, the Flight Safety Foundation initiated a project entitled Runway Safety Initiative (RSI) to address the challenge of runway safety. This was an international effort with participants representing the full spectrum of stakeholders from the aviation community. The effort initially reviewed the three areas of runway safety: runway incursions, runway confusion, and runway excursions. After a review of current runway safety efforts, specific data on the various aspects of runway safety were obtained. After reviewing the initial data, the RSI Group determined that it would be most effective to focus its efforts on reducing the risk of runway excursions.

Working with industry, Boeing is implementing a combination of procedural improvements, flight crew knowledge, and flight deck enhancements to mitigate runway overrun excursions during landing.

Tail strikes can cause significant damage and cost operators millions of dollars in repairs and lost revenue. In the most extreme scenario, a tail strike can cause pressure bulkhead failure, which can ultimately lead to structural failure; however, long shallow scratches that are not repaired correctly can also result in increased risks. Yet tail strikes can be prevented when flight crews understand their causes and follow certain standard procedures.

A go-around maneuver may be performed in a number of situations, including when requested by air traffic control (ATC) or when an airplane is making an unstabilized approach. Once a go-around decision has been made, flight crews must focus on ensuring that the maneuver is flown correctly by being aware of the difficulties that can occur and following the appropriate procedures to address those difficulties. A go-around maneuver can be both effective and safe when performed according to standard operating procedures by crews who are alerted to possible hazards.

An overweight landing is defined as a landing made at a gross weight in excess of the maximum design (i.e., structural) landing weight for a particular model. A pilot may consider making an overweight landing when a situation arises that requires the airplane to return to the takeoff airport or divert to another airport soon after takeoff. In these cases, the airplane may arrive at the landing airport at a weight considerably above the maximum design landing weight. The pilot must then decide whether to reduce the weight prior to landing or land overweight. The weight can be reduced either by holding to burn off fuel or by jettisoning fuel. There are important issues to consider when a decision must be made to land overweight, burn off fuel, or jettison fuel (when possible).

Landing on Contaminated Runways involves increased levels of risk related to deceleration and directional control. Aircraft Landing Performance data takes account of the deceleration issues in scheduling the Landing Distance Required (LDR), and the Aircraft Limitations specified in the AFM can be expected to impose a reduced maximum crosswind limitation. Operator Procedures may further restrict all such operations, or impose flight crew-specific restrictions or requirements. Despite all procedural precautions, contaminated runway landings are a rare event for most flight crews and although this serves to ensure a full focus on the task, the lack of real experience, and the limited ability to create realistic scenarios in most simulators, means that a full understanding of the issues involved can be an additional safeguard.

A lack of go around decision is the leading factor in the majority of approach and landing accidents. One in ten go around reports records a potentially hazardous go-around outcome. This article gives some hints on how to make it more efficient and safer.

The Flight Safety Foundation analyzed 16 years of aircraft accident data and found that the most common type of accident is the runway excursion. They noted that the almost complete (97 percent) failure to call go-arounds as a preventive mitigation of the risk of continuing to fly unstable approaches constituted the no. 1 cause of runway excursions, and therefore of approach and landing accidents.

The very respected Flight Safety Foundation has published a list of recommendations about how to combat the psychology of non-compliance with GA policies and procedures

Relative-safety factors influence flight crews to perform far fewer missed approaches than predicted by the incidence of unstabilized approaches. The timing of the decision can be critical to the maneuver’s outcome.

Most air transport pilots lack adequate training in how to perform the most common go-arounds — those with both engines operating in the high-pressure environment of a missed approach, according to a study by the French Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA).

Studying the psychology of decision making during unstable approaches and why go-around policies are ineffective.

Pilots are often forced to deal with shorter-term restraints that may require them to temporarily abandon their cruise strategy one or more times during a flight.

Used appropriately, the cost index (CI) feature of the flight management computer (FMC) can help airlines significantly reduce operating costs. However, many operators don’t take full advantage of this powerful tool.

The Flight Safety Foundation Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Task Force found that visual approaches were being conducted in 41 percent of 118 fatal approach-andlanding accidents worldwide in 1980 through 1996

Factors that may contribute to approach-and- landing accidents include flight over hilly terrain, reduced visibility, visual illusions, adverse winds, contaminated runways and/or limited approach aids. Flight crews should be aware of the compounding nature of these hazards during approach and landing.

An excellent document about go-around essentials...

Plan to avoid the rocks during an emergency descent.

A surprising number of aircraft accidents have occurred during visual approaches or during the visual segment following an instrument approach. An interesting review initiated by Captain Fred H. LORENZ has been published sometime ago.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations and the European Joint Aviation Requirements redefined V1 as the maximum airspeed at which a flight crew must take the first action to safely reject a takeoff. Other revisions change the method of compensating for the time required by pilots to take action to reject a takeoff; require accelerate-stop data based on airplanes with fully worn brakes; and require wet-runway takeoff-performance data in airplane flight manuals.

As the computer technology of aircraft navigation systems became more and more sophisticated, aircraft and avionics manufacturers attempt to exploit this computer capability in aircraft operations. One of the most profound capabilities being exploited recently is the aircraft’s capability of navigating vertically on an instrument approach without reference to an external electronic guidance signal such as an ILS glideslope or MLS elevation signal. This mode of operation is called "VNAV". The vertical guidance is usually based on barometric altimetry augmented with information from a mix of navigation sensors. Vertical command information may be retrieved from the aircraft’s aeronautical information database or from the pilot’s input into the Flight Management System (FMS). Vertical command information while conducting VNAV on a conventional non-precision approach is normally retrieved entirely from the aircraft’s aeronautical database.

On February 8th, 2002, The National Transportation safety Board (NTSB) in cooperation with the French "Bureau Enquetes Accidents" (BEA) issued recommendations that aircraft manufacturers re-emphazise the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer, showing how some maneuvers can result in exceeding limits and even load to structural failure. The purpose of this Airbus FCOM Bulletin is to re-emphazise proper operational use of the rudder, highlight certification requirements and rudder control design characteristics.

Recall of the last procedure enhancements.

Airframe manufacturers, airlines,pilot groups, and government andregulatoryagencies, have developed this training resource dedicated to reducing the number of rejected takeoff (RTO) accidents.

Carbon brakes are now standard equipment.The use of these brakes provides a substantial reduction in airplane operating empty weight, but in-service experience has generally shown lower brake life than originally expected. Analysis has revealed a difference between the wear characteristics of carbon versus steel brakes. It is believed that improvements in carbon brake life can be achieved through better understanding of the operational factors affecting carbon brake life.

Taxi incidents are usually perceived to be less dangerous than incidents in flight,but they may cost a lot of money! This Airbus document reviews some safety precautions specific to Airbus aircraft, pushback and taxi techniques (One-Engine Taxi - A340 Two Engines), powerpush, taxi with Deflated Tires, etc.

There have been a number of accidents related to take-off in conditions in which snow and/or other forms of freezing precipitation were falling while the aircraft was on the ground preparing for departure. While there is no doubt that air crew have a clear understanding of the legal and airline requirement for "clean" aircraft prior to departure, there are times when pilots must exercise their judgment in determining whether or not small accumulations on the wings or other aerodynamic surfaces constitute accumulations which may have an impact on the aerodynamic performance of the aircraft. This article provides additional information on the performance and handling of the aircraft with contamination on the wings and other flying surfaces to assist pilots in making these critical go/ no-go decisions.

Airbus Recommendations.

Airframe manufacturers, airlines,pilot groups, and government andregulatoryagencies, have developed this training resource dedicated to reducing the number of rejected takeoff (RTO) accidents.

This Airbus production reviews some rotation flying techniques and is written as a reminder of various recommendations. This document is specific to Airbus pilots.

This interesting Boeing document reviews causes and prevention, training recommendations and preventive measures to avoid tailstrikes in strong gusty winds.

A high speed rejected takeoff during the takeoff roll. The decision on whether or not to perform a rejected takeoff -specifically, on whether or not to STOP or GO- requires comprehensive flight crew awareness of the many risks involved. The aim of this Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note is, therefore, to review the STOP or GO decision-making process, and the associated operational and prevention strategies to be applied, in order to limit the risks of taking inappropriate actions and unsafe decisions.

Flight crews primarily use their judgment to identify and report hard landings, but recorded flight data also might be useful to gauge the severity of the impact before a conditional maintenance inspection is performed. The accident record shows that hard landings often involve substantial damage and sometimes result in fatalities.

This article reviews the principles of tire traction, landing techniques and the use of brakes, speedbrakes and reverse thrust to stop the airplane during landing...

This Airbus Briefing Note is primarily designed for aircraft that do not have flight envelope protection (e.g. A300/A310/A300-600). However, the key points at the end of this briefing note are also applicable to all aircraft types, with or without flight envelope protection.

This Flight Safety Foundation produced a very good debriefing of an accident which involved a Tower Air 747 classics on takeoff...

A rejected landing (also referred to as an aborted landing) is defined as a go-around maneuver initiated after touchdown of the main landing gear or after bouncing. Although a rare occurrence, a rejected landing is a challenging maneuver decided and conducted in an unanticipated and unprepared manner...

Boeing has developed the Quiet Climb System, an automated avionics feature for quiet procedures that involve thrust cutback after takeoff. By reducing and restoring thrust automatically, the system lessens crew workload and results in a consistently quiet footprint, which helps airlines comply with restrictions and may allow for an increase in takeoff payload.

Pushbacks present a potentially serious hazard to ground personnel. From 1964 through December 1991, a search of the Boeing Product Safety Jet Transport Safety Events data base revealed 31 reported accidents worldwide where personnel were run over by the airplane wheels during the pushback process.

This Flight Operations Review has been initialy published by Boeing in 1986. It discussses the key elements that lead to a good landing.

The purpose of this Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note is to address tailstrike occurrence at landing.

The purpose of this Airbus Briefing is to address tailstrikes occurrence at takeoff.

In recent years, there has been an increase in the incidence of significant structural damage to commercial airplanes from hard nosegear touchdowns. In most cases, the main gear touchdowns were relatively normal. The damage resulted from high nose-down pitch rates generated by full or nearly full forward control column application before nosegear touchdown. Flight crews need to be aware of the potential for significant structural damage from hard nosegear contact and know which actions to take to prevent such incidents.

This Briefing Note provides an overview of the factors involved in altitude deviations. This document can be used for stand-alone reading or as the basis for the development of an airline’s altitude awareness program.

In this briefing, Airbus explains how to determine Landing Distance and approach speed determination in case of an engine failure during approach. It also reviews the case of multiple failures, use of the autopilot and autothrottle. This document contents an exhaustive study on a topic rarely detailed...

The term ''optimum use of automation'' refers to the integrated and coordinated use of Autopilot / Flight Director, Autothrottle / autothrust, and Flight Management System.

How to improve Stopping Distances on specifically prepared runways.

A very interesting and detailed technical article issued by Airbus.

Boeing asks a very simple question: "how narrow is narrow?"

Right adherence to procedures fo takeof weight, enter of gravity and stabilizer trim setting reduces the likehood of uncommanded or delayed rotation

To reduce loss of control accidents, the U.S. government has funded a program to provide airplane-upset-recovery training for 2,000 airline pilots. The training is conducted in an aerobatic single-engine airplane and in a multi-engine jet modified as a variable-stability in-flight simulator.

This Boeing document is a review of the events leading to, and lessons learnt from the over-run of Quantas B747-400 at Bangkok Thailand, September 23, 1999.

Basic physics makes slippery-runway issues crystal clear!

Center of gravity (CG) and altitude significantly affect the longitudinal stability of an airplane. An understanding of handling characteristics at various CG positions and altitudes permits flight crews to use proper control inputs when manually flying throughout the flight envelope.

In the summer of 1997 there were two accidents, involving the loss of large transport aircraft, which occurred in very heavy rain. The first casualty was a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 which came down on Guam, and the second, a Vietnamese Tupolev in Cambodia. Both aircraft accidents occurred in torrential rain on approach to an airport. Although it may turn out that rain was not a factor in either of these accidents, research indicates that heavy rainfall can have a significant effect on the performance of an aircraft.

This special issue of Flight Safety Digest presents two reports on the experiences of pilots who fly aircraft with glass cockpit that is, modern aircraft with highly automated flight management systems and electronic flight instrument systems. The reports sample the views of line pilots regarding the advantages and disadvantages of flying these advanced-technology aircraft.

The purpose of this document is to provide Airbus pilots with the agreed interpretations of the currently AWO (All Weather Operations) regulations.

Every takeoff is an opportunity to save fuel. If each takeoff and climb is performed efficiently, an airline can realize significant savings over time. But what constitutes an efficient takeoff? How should a climb be executed for maximum fuel savings? The most efficient flights actually begin long before the airplane is cleared for takeoff.

A good understanding of cruise flight can not only help crews operate efficiently and save their companies money, but can also help them deal with low fuel situations. As an additional benefit, the less fuel consumed, the more environmentally friendly the flight.

This briefing note is intended to help the reader gain and maintain situational awareness, to prevent falling into the traps associated with the loss of situational awareness and to avoid the adverse effects of the loss of situational awareness on flight safety.

Driftdown and Oxygen Procedure and lessons learnt from an arline perspective.

It is the sole responsibility of the pilot to conduct proper descent and approach flight planning. It is not at all ATC's task to do descent planning for pilots by giving descent instructions.  Good descent and approach planning is the foundation for a successful landing.

Operations in crosswind conditions require strict adherence to applicable crosswind limitations or maximum recommended crosswind values, operational recommendations and handling techniques, particularly when operating on wet or contaminated runways.

This Boeing document explains origin of crosswind guidelines and reviews crosswind values, crosswind effects on high by-pass engine airplanes and takeoff and landing techniques.

Airbus has been asked by some operators to study the case of a circling approach at high altitude airports with one engine failed.This study has shown that the published procedure may not be adequate at high altitude, but also at high temperature.

Brake energy limitations may not be common for most operators, and so are not well understood:

Although a rare occurrence, a rejected landing is a challenging maneuver decided and conducted in an unanticipated and unprepared manner.

This article is a tribute to the DHL Airbus A300 crew who has been hit by a missile while taking off from Baghdad. After having lost hydraulic power, the crew had then to learn how to fly and land an asymmetric aircraft using the only thrust control. Airbus explains this whole incredible and dramatic story.

Boeing makes here a human factors approach to preventing Tail Strikes. Very interesting document.

In this document Airbus provides statistics, most common causes, factors affecting the margins, reviews aircraft design features and gives operational recommendations.

This document has been published by the respected and well-known Flight Safety Foundation. Safety can be jeopardized when aircraft deviate from their assigned altitudes. Carefully implemented altitude awareness programs have been adopted by some airlines. These proven programs focus on improving communications, altitude alerter setting procedure, crew prioritization and task allocation, and ensuring correct altimeter settings.

Autoland systems were developped for landing in fog but since its introduction, use of autoland has been extended into other areas that were not considered at the outset. Operations on contaminated runways are not considered during certification but the case is practically studied. This article has been published for the 10th Performance and Operations Conference in 1998.

Updates guidance and research findings boost confidence that airplane upset recovery is on the right track

This document is the following of the Airplane Upset Recovery Part 1

The information and techniques presented in this Boeing training aid are aimed at industry solutions for large swept-wing turbofan airplanes typically seating more than 100 passengers.

This Airbus Training Aid itself was the basis of the article entitled “Aerodynamic Principles Of Large Aircraft Upsets” that appeared as a Special Edition of FAST in June 1998

Inability to assess or manage the aircraft energy level during the approach often is cited as a causal factor in unstabilized approaches. Either a deficit of energy (being low and/or slow) or an excess of energy (being high and/or fast) may result in approach-and-landing accidents, such as: loss of control, landing short, hard landing, tail strike; runway excursion and/or runway overrun. This Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note provides background information and operational guidelines for a better understanding of energy management during intermediate approach and during final approach.

Airbus pilots will find in this Airbus briefing lots of information concerning braking recommendations. This document covers all phases of flight from the preliminary cockpit preparation to the end of of the flight.

Altitude deviations may result in substantial loss of aircraft vertical separation or horizontal separation, which could cause a midair collision. Maneuvers to avoid other aircraft often result in injuries to passengers, flight crewmembers and, particularly, to cabin crewmembers.

Few air transport accidents occur on calm sunny days; risk increases during flight over hilly terrain, with reduced visibility, adverse winds, contaminated runways and limited approach aids. Visual illusions also can contribute to approach and landing accidents.

The Flight Safety Foundation Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Task Force found that inadequate flight crew interaction with automatic flight systems was a causal factor 1 in 20 percent of 76 approach-and-landing accidents and serious incidents worldwide.

Flight crews on international routes encounter different units of measurement for setting barometric altimeters, thus requiring altimeter crosscheck procedures.

The importance of being go-around-prepared and being go around- minded must be emphasized, because a go-around is not a frequent occurrence. This requires having a clear mental image of applicable briefings, standard calls, sequences of actions, task sharing and cross-checking, and being prepared to abandon the approach if requirements are not met.

A rejected landing (also called an aborted landing) is a go-around maneuver initiated after touchdown of the main landing gear. A rejected landing is a challenging maneuver and typically is recommended only when an aircraft bounces more than approximately five feet (1.5 meters) off the runway after touchdown

The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Task Force found that delayed braking action during the landing roll-out was involved in some of the accidents and serious incidents in which slow/delayed crew action was a causal factor.

Operations in crosswind conditions require adherence to applicable limitations or recommended maximum crosswinds and recommended operational and handling techniques, particularly when operating on wet runways or runways contaminated by standing water, snow, slush or ice.

Incorrect management of the descent-and-approach profile and/or aircraft energy condition may result in a loss of situational awareness; and/or an unstabilized approach.
Either situation increases the risk of approach-and-landing accidents, including those involving controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).

The flight crew’s inability to assess or to manage the aircraft’s energy condition during approach is cited often as a cause of unstabilized approaches. Either a deficit of energy (low/slow) or an excess of energy (high/fast) may result in an approach-and-landing incident or accident involving loss of control, landing before reaching the runway, hard landing, tailstrike and runway overrun.

Runway excursions occur when an aircraft on the runway surface departs the end or the side of the runway surface. Runway excursions can occur on takeoff or landing. They
consist of two types of events: Veer-off (a runway excursion in which an aircraft departs the side of a runway) and Overrun (a runway excursion in which an aircraft departs
the end of a runway). Runway excursions can occur after any type of approach in any light condition or environmental condition.

Unstabilized approaches are frequent factors in approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs), including those involving controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). Unstabilized approaches are often the result of a flight crew who conducted the approach without sufficient time to 'Plan', 'Prepare' and 'Conduct' a stabilized approach.

A typical training program to reduce approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs) should include the following: alert flight crews to the factors that may cause ALAs and CFIT; Ensure that situational awareness is maintained at all times; Ensure that crews attain proficiency in conducting approach procedures for their aircraft type;  Provide flight crews with adequate knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the GPWS or terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS)and ensure that flight crews are proficient in conducting the terrain- avoidance maneuver required in response to a GPWS /TAWS warning.

It is a common rule for all aircraft: the SOP for landing requests that the flight crew perform a full stop landing after thrust reversers selection. However, in-service
flight data analysis revealed that the equivalent of one go-around per month is performed after selection of thrust reversers. This Airbus article describes an event where the flight crew performed a go-around after they had selected thrust reversers on an A320 aircraft. The reverser on one engine remained deployed until the end of the flight. The article explains how adherence to SOPs will prevent recurrence of this kind of event and describes the product enhancements that Airbus developed as additional safety barriers.

Using an erroneous barometric reference setting during approach may cause the aircraft to fly lower than the published approach path, when the vertical guidance and trajectory deviations use the barometric reference. This can lead to a risk of controlled flight into terrain in poor visibility conditions or at night. This document explains the potential consequences of an erroneous barometric reference. It also provides guidance to flight crews on how to detect it, and describes the available system enhancements to alert flight crews when an erroneous BARO reference is detected.

The ILS is accurate and reliable, but the ILS antenna design today causes secondary glide slopes to appear above the primary glide slope. Flight crews must be aware of this phenomenon to prevent unwanted aircraft behavior during an ILS glide slope capture. This article explains the phenomenon of secondary glideslopes and their effect on aircraft systems. It provides guidance and examples that show how flight crews can prevent capturing a secondary glide slope. It also describes the protections on Airbus aircraft that limit the effect of an unintended secondary glide slope capture on the aircraft trajectory.

TCAS RAs are not correctly followed in more than 40% of cases according to a recent study published by Eurocontrol, making non-compliance with TCAS RAs one of the top 5 Air Traffic Management (ATM) operational and safety risks. This article explains how the TCAS Alert Prevention and AP/FD TCAS functions can improve the situation by respectively reducing the number of RAs in congested airspace, and assisting flight crews to follow TCAS RAs in an optimum manner. The article also recalls the TCAS warning procedure step-by-step, with and without the AP/FD TCAS function and provides guidance for training flight crews.

The transition from instrument references to external visual references is an important element of any type of instrument approach. Some variations exist in company operating philosophies about flight crew task sharing for: acquiring visual references, conducting the landing, and conducting the go-around.

This is an interesting Airbus document dealing with crosswind recommendations